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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case
This case is about the appropriate remedy to be applied in the case of a breach by the

purchaser of a contract to purchase real estate. Rather than award the standard measure of
damages recognized by this Court - the difference between the contract price and the value of
the real estate at the time of breach - the District Court ordered specific performance of the
contract. The District Court's order of specific performance is erroneous in that it ignored two
fundamental rules of equity: (1) that a court should not order an equitable remedy, including
specific performance, that is not feasible; and (2) that equity will not intervene where the
aggrieved party has a plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law.

B.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings

1.

Bac\{ground Of Mr. Mason

Mr. Mason has been developing and building single-family and multi-family
communities in Idaho for seventeen years. Since 1990, he has been involved in the development
of approximately 30 single-family subdivisions and 8 multi-family projects. Each of those
subdivisions/projects involved some element of bank or investor financing. See R., Exh. I
(sealed)! (Affidavit of Edward J. Mason, ~ 3).

2.

The Agreements To Purchase The Subject Properties, And Mr. Mason's
Breach Of Those Agreements

Many of the facts relevant to this case are taken from Mr. Mason's financial records, which
are confidential in nature and are subject to a Protective Order entered by the District Court.
The affidavits setting forth confidential financial information were filed under seal with the
District Court and have been lodged with this Court as part of a sealed record.
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On April 12, 2006, Mr. Mason entered into two separate Real Estate Purchase and Sale
Agreements. See R., Exh. 2 (Affidavit of Frank 1. Fazzio, Jr.,

~~

2-3). The first Real Estate

Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that Mr. Mason would purchase a residence and a parcel
of real property on which the residence is located from Respondents Dr. and Mrs. Fazzio for the
price of$1,530,000. Id. The second Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that
Mr. Mason would purchase two parcels of real property consisting offarmland from Respondent
Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, for the price of $2,000,000. Id. at ~ 4. Each Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement provided for a closing date of February 26, 2007. ld. Mr. Mason
was not able to close on the purchase of the properties on February 26,2007. ld. at

~

6. Thus,

Mr. Mason was in breach of both Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreements as of that date.
The parties subsequently entered into two separate Agreements to Resolve Dispute
Arising Out of Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement Dated April 12, 2006 (the" Agreements
to Purchase the Subject Properties").2 ld. at ~ 9, Exhs. A-B. The Agreements to Purchase the
Subject Properties provided that they superseded the original Real Estate Purchase and Sale
Agreements. ld. The terms of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Propeliies required
Mr. Mason to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties by December 21, 2007 if Mason
obtained plat approval by that date from the city of Kuna. Id. If plat approval was not obtained
by December 21, 2007, then Mr. Mason was required to close by March 21, 2008. ld. The city
of Kuna approved the preliminary plat prior to December 21,2007, but Mr. Mason was not able

2

The properties that are the subject of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties are
the same properties Mr. Mason had previously agreed to purchase and will hereinafter be
referred to as the "Subject Properties."
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to close on the purchase of the properties. Id. at ~ 11. Thus, Mr. Mason was in breach of the
Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties as of December 21, 2007.

3.

Mr. Mason's Inability To Close On The Purchase Of The Subject Properties

At all times during the negotiations for the purchase of the Subject Properties, Mr. Mason
believed that he would be able to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties. The real estate
market in Idaho was strong and bank and/or investor financing for real estate developments was
readily available. Subsequent to the negotiations to purchase the Subject Properties, however,
there has been a significant downturn in the Idaho real estate market, property values have fallen,
and the availability of financing for real estate developments has decreased substantially. See
R., Exh. 1 (sealed) (Affidavit of Edward J. Mason, ~~ 5-6).
At all times subsequent to the negotiations to purchase the Subject Properties, Mr. Mason
has made diligent efforts to close on the purchase of the Subject Property. However, he simply
has been unable to do so because he cannot obtain the necessary financing. Attempts have been
made to obtain financing from many different sources. See id. at 7-8.
The original plan was to obtain financing through First Horizon Construction Lending
("First Horizon"). First Horizon initiated an appraisal on the Subject Property, which indicated
an "infeasibility issue with the project, in that the costs to acquire/develop exceed values
generated." Furthermore, with the downturn in the Idaho real estate market, the Boise office of
First Horizon closed in December 2007, laying off all employees, including its loan manager.
Before going out of business in December 2007, after extensive financial documentation and
meetings, First Horizon approved a financing package that required a high equity position. First
Horizon agreed to finance just over $1,800,000 of the purchase price. When Mr. Mason was
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unable to obtain an equity partner for the remainder of the purchase price, he informed
Dr. Fazzio of the situation and requested that he agree to carry a portion of the financing through
an owner-financing arrangement. Dr. Fazzio refused. See id. at 9.
In January 2008, First Horizon announced that it was closing its national construction
lending division and all pending loan financing was terminated. Thus, financing through First
Horizon is no longer a viable option. See id. at 10-11.
Mr. Mason also attempted to obtain financing through Eagle Equity Group, which is an
investor group that has helped finance some ofMr. Mason's other developments. The Eagle
Equity Group declined to finance the purchase of the Subject Property. See id. at 12.
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through the RBC Builder Financial Group,
which helped finance the acquisition and development of the Galiano Subdivision, a subdivision
Mr. Mason is developing adjacent to the Subject Property. RBC informed Mr. Mason that no
additional financing of a large subdivision would be approved due to the excess lot inventory and
poor market conditions in the area. RBC annonnced in March 2008 that it was closing its
western offices and that it would only have ongoing U.S. operations in the Southeast and Texas.
Thus, financing in Idaho through the RBC is no longer available. See id. at 13.
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through Fred Berman, who has invested in
many of his developments. Mr. Berman declined to invest in the project. See id. at 14.
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through Magnet Bank, which is currently
financing one of his developments, the Ambleside subdivision. The Magnet Bank declined to
help finance the purchase of the Subject Properties due to the depressed market conditions and
the excess lot inventory and current financing of the Ambleside subdivision. In November 2007,
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the Eagle Magnet Bank was shut down overnight with employees arriving to locked doors. See
id. at 15.

In February 2008, Mr. Mason attended a National Association of Homebuilders
convention. Mr. Mason presented information regarding the financing of the Subject Properties
to various banking and investor professionals attending the conference. He encountered a
general lack of financing available for development projects due to the depressed real estate and
financial markets. The only individual who expressed interest in the project was Meg Kelley,
who is a Commercial & Residential Loan Officer with the Patriot National Bank in Stamford,
Connecticut, and who also has ties to several independent investors and hedge funds. See id. at

16.
Mr. Mason provided additional information and financial documentation to Meg Kelley,
but the Patriot National Bank was not interested in providing financing. However, Meg Kelley
located an investor from New York that was interested in a conference call to discuss the project.
Ted Mason Signature Homes, Inc. staff, Meg Kelley and the investor had a conference call to
discuss feasibility. The investor reviewed the financial ratio requirements of investment as well
as terms. Mr. Mason is not able to satisfy these high equity-to-debt ratios or liquidity
requirements, so the investor was not interested in investing in any project at this time with
Mr. Mason. In further conversations with Meg Kelly, she indicated that Mr. Mason and his
companies would need to have a stronger balance sheet before national investors would be
interested in reviewing specific projects. See id. at 17.
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Mr. Mason has also spoken with three other private lenders: Hopkins Financial Services;
Excelsior Management; and Seattle Funding Group, Ltd. Each of these private lenders would
require an equity investor, which Mr. Mason has not been able to obtain. See id. at 18.
Mr. Mason continues to look for a way to finance the purchase of the Subject Property.
Indeed, he would still like to close on the purchase of the Subject Property. However, given his
current financial situation, the depressed real estate market and the increasingly tightened credit
market, there is no way he can close on the purchase of the Subject Property. See id. at 4,19.
Moreover, closing on the properties in question would not be made possible by
liquidating assets. The vast majority of Mr. Mason's assets are in the form of real property,
which serves as the collateral on bank loans. Not only would it be extremely difficult to sell that
property under the current real estate market conditions, but in most cases Mr. Mason already
owes the banks more than the appraised value of the property. Thus, liquidating those assets
would not provide any cash with which to close on the properties. See R., Exh. 3 (sealed)
(Supplemental Affidavit of Edward 1. Mason,

~~

3-11).

In order to close on the Idaho Livestock Company, LLC property, Mr. Mason would need
to have cash available in the amount of $2,000,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
In order to close on the Fazzio property, Mr. Mason would need to have cash available in the
amount of$I,530,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Thus, the total amount of
cash that would be required to close on the Subject Properties is well over $3.5 Million.
Mr. Mason does not have in his possession, nor does he have access to, the over $3.5 Million that
would be required to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties. See R., Exh. I (sealed)
(Affidavit of Edward J. Mason,

~

22).
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If this Court were to affirm the District Court's Order of specific performance ordering
Mr. Mason to close on the Subject Property, he simply will not be able to comply with that order.

4.

Procedural Posture

Respondents filed the Complaint on January 22, 2008. R., p. 6-68. The Complaint
alleged that Mr. Mason breached his contractual obligations under the Agreements to Purchase
the Subject Properties. Respondents subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asking
the Court to either (l) confirm the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties as arbitration
awards; or (2) enter a judgment for specific performance. Specifically, Respondents requested a
"Judgment for specific performance .... [rJequiring Mason to immediately close on the
purchase of the Subject Properties." R., Exh. 1, p. 10.
Mr. Mason opposed the motion for summary judgment on grounds that specific
performance should not be ordered because it would be impossible for Mr. Mason to close on the
purchase of the subject properties. R., Exh. 2 (sealed). Mr. Mason relied on this Court's
repeated recognition of the equitable rules that a court of equity should not order a remedy,
including specific performance, that is not feasible and that an equitable remedy should not be
ordered where there exists and adequate remedy at law. Mr. Mason did not contest the fact that
he breached the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties, nor did Mr. Mason assert the
substantive impossibility of performance defense. Despite the fact that the substantive
impossibility of performance defense was never asserted by Mr. Mason, the District Court, the
Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the
substantive impossibility of performance defense. R., Exhs. 4-5. Mr. Mason responded by
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explaining that the substantive impossibility of performance defense is inapplicable to this case
and is a different defense than that being asserted by Mr. Mason. R., Exh. 4.
In a December 30, 2008 Order, Judge Sticklen granted Respondents' Motion for
Summary Judgment, ordering that "[s]pecific performance on the contract is to be completed
within thirty days of the date of this order; ifnot so accomplished, ajudgment for the purchase
price may be entered, upon satisfaction of which the properties must be conveyed to Mason."
R., pp. 78-83. As Mr. Mason had previously made clear, he was unable to comply with the order
of specific performance because he did not have the means to close on the Subject Properties.
Mr. Mason appealed from the Order, but that appeal was dismissed as premature because
a final judgment had not yet been issued. Mr. Mason then sought reconsideration of the Order,
which was denied by the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood, who had since replaced Judge
Sticklen. Judge Greenwood entered a final Judgment (the "Judgment") in favor of Respondents
Dr. and Mrs. Fazzio in the principal amount of$I,530,000, plus interest in the amount of

$412,471.08. See Order to Augment the Record, dated November 17,2009, Exh. 1. Judge
Greenwood also entered Judgment in favor of Respondent Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, in
the amount of $2,000,000, plus interest in the amount of $539, 177.66. Id. The Judgment further
provides that Respondents have a valid, subsisting vendor's lien against the Subject Properties
and that said vendor's liens may be enforced through sale of the Subject Properties in the same
manner and subject to the same restrictions as the execution sale of property subject to a decree
of foreclosure as set forth in Chapter 1 of Title 6, Idaho Code. Id. Judge Greenwood also
awarded attorneys' fees and costs in favor of respondents in the sum of$36,999.50. See Order
Granting Motion to Augment Record, dated October 6, 2009.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

(1)

Whether the District Court erred in ordering specific performance of the

Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties, where the Respondent had an adequate remedy
at law and where the order of specific performance was not feasible.
(2)

Whether, upon reversal of the order granting specific performance, this Court

should also reverse the award of attorney fees on grounds that Respondent is not the prevailing
party. 3

III.
ARGUMENT

A.

Standard Of Review
The Court reviews an order of specific performance for an abuse of discretion. Mallory

v. Watt, 100 Idaho 119, 123,594 P.2d 629, 633 (1979). When determining whether a district
court abused its discretion, the Court considers three factors: "(1) whether the trial court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with applicable legal principles, and (3) whether it reached its

3

Mr. Mason had initially indicated that he would be appealing the District Court's order of
attorney fees with regard to the amount of the attorneys' fees award. After further review of
the issue, Mr. Mason has elected not to pursue an appeal of the reasonableness of the
amount of the attorney fees award and to focus this appeal only on the order of specific
performance. Upon reversal of the order of specific performance, however, Respondent will
not be the prevailing party, and the award of attorney fees should also be reversed as
premature.
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decision through an exercise of reason." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338,
344 (2006).
B.

The District Court Erred In Ordering Specific Performance

1.

Specific Performance Is Not Appropriate Because It Would Not Be Possible
For Mr. Mason To Comply With The Order Of Specific Performance

"There is no legal right to specific performance." Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc.
134 Idaho 264, 270, 1 P.3d 292, 298 (2000). Instead, specific performance "is an extraordinary
remedy that can provide relief when legal remedies are inadequate." Id "[S]pecific
performance is an equitable remedy and should not be granted when it would be unjust,
oppressive, or unconscionable." Id The decision to grant specific performance is a matter
within the District Court's discretion. Id "When making its decision the court must balance the
equities between the parties to determine whether specific performance is appropriate." Id

In ordering specific performance, the District Court did not recognize, much less follow,
the well-established rule that a court should not order an equitable remedy, including specific
performance, which is not feasible. See, e.g., Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 125,227 P.2d
351,359 (1951), overruled on other grounds by David Steed and Associates, Inc. v. Young, 115
Idaho 247, 766 P.2d 717 (1988) ("Equity will not enter a decree for specific performance the
enforcement of which is not practicable or feasible."); Faloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co.,
99 Idaho 740, 745-46, 588 P.2d 939, 944-45 (1978) (dismissing claim for specific performance
because "[i]t is well established that the courts will not order the impossible"); Childs v. Reed, 34
Idaho 450, 202 P. 685; 686 (1921) ("Where the contract is of such a nature that obedience to the

- 10 43464.0001,1793506.1

decree cannot be obtained by the ordinary processes of the court, equity will decline to
interfere.").
It is indisputable that Mr. Mason does not have the approximately $3.5 Million that

would be required to close on the Subject Properties as ordered by the Court. See R., Exhs. 1, 3
(sealed). Thus, the District Court erred in ordering specific performance.

2.

The Equitable Rule That Equity Courts Should Not Order The Impossible Is
Separate And Distinct From The Substantive Impossibility Of Performance
Defense

The rule that equity should not order the impossible is an equitable rule, not a substantive
defense. Rather than apply the equitable rule, the Court applied and rejected the substantive
contract defense of impossibility of performance as if the two rules were one and the same. The
District Court's analysis was erroneous in that the two rules are not one and the same. The
equitable rule merely precludes an order of equitable relief and leaves the plaintiff with a remedy
in law, i.e., damages. See, e.g.. Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 410 P.2d 434 (1966)
(reversing the district court's order of specific performance of a real estate contract, and
remanding to the district court to calculate damages). In other words, the equitable rule cited by
Mr. Mason goes not to the issue ofliability, but to the issue of what remedy is appropriate. The
substantive impossibility of performance doctrine is a complete defense to a contract and leaves
the plaintiff with no remedy at all, either equitable or at law. See Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho
252,257,706 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that the substantive doctrine of
impossibility of performance results in the party asserting the defense being "relieved of his duty
to perform") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264 (1981)).
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"The doctrine of impossibility operates to excuse performance when the bargained-for
performance is no longer in existence or is no longer capable of being performed due to the
unforeseen, supervening act of a third party." Haessly v, Safeeo Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121
Idaho 463, 465, 825 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1992). "A sine qua non for application of the doctrine is
that the parties must have contracted, expressly or in necessary contemplation, with Teference to
continued existence of the specific thing as a condition essential to performance." Id
The above described impossibility of performance doctrine serves as a defense to a
breach of contract claim. In other words, the impossibility of performance excuses the breach.
However, Mr. Mason has not ever asserted impossibility of performance as a defense to
Respondents' breach of contract claim because the authorities generally hold that financial
inability to perform does not excuse a breach. Moreover, "impossibility that is only temporary
will not act to discharge a contractual obligation if the contract can yet be performed after the
impossibility ceases." Sutheimer v, Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 85, 896 P.2d 989, 993 (et. App.
1995). Impossibility of performance for purposes of excusing a breach of contract is simply not
an issue in this case.
Despite the fact that the impossibility of performance defense was never asserted by
Mr. Mason, Judge Sticklen asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the
impossibility of performance doctrine in connection with Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment. See R., Exhs. 3-4. Mr. Mason provided supplemental briefing on the issue,
explaining the difference between the equitable rule that equitable courts should not order the
impossible and the substantive defense of impossibility of performance. See R., Exh. 4.
Mr. Mason expressly stated that he was not relying on the substantive impossibility of
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performance defense. Id. at p. 3 ("Mr. Mason is not currently asserting impossibility of
performance as a defense to Dr. Fazzio's breach of contract claim because the authorities
generally hold that financial inability to perform does not excuse a breach. . .. Impossibility of
performance for purposes of excusing a breach of contract is not at issue for purposes of
Dr. Fazzio's motion for summary judgment.").
Even though Mr. Mason specifically disclaimed any reliance on the substantive
impossibility of performance defense, Judge Sticklen proceeded to grant Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment by concluding that the substantive impossibility of performance doctrine is
inapplicable. Specifically, she explained:
Furthermore, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently noted that
"[mlost importantly it is the task itself which must be impossibleit is not enough that the particular promissor is unable to perform
the task if it would be possible for a different promissor to
perform." State v. Chacon, [146 Idaho 520, (Ct. App. 2008)].
While this case was criminal in nature, it is still persuasive Idaho
dicta on the issue as it relates to the enforcement of contracts.
R., p. 83; see also. id. at p. 82 (citing Christy v. Pilkington, 273 S.W. 2d 533 (Ark. 1954), for the
proposition that the substantive defense of impossibility of performance does not apply to a
"subjective impossibility" of performing).
Mr. Mason does not disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the substantive
impossibility of performance defense is inapplicable. Indeed, Mr. Mason conceded the point.
The problem is that the District Court did not address the equitable rule that a court in equity
should not order the impossible.
In ordering specific performance, the District Court abused its discretion in that it applied
the wrong legal principle. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho at 873 (explaining that, in
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determining whether a district court has abused its discretion, the Court should look to whether
the district court "acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable
legal principles.") (emphasis added); see also State of Idaho v. Watkins, _

Idaho _ , _

P.3d

_,2009 Opinion No. 151, Docket No. 35687 (December 24,2009), wherein the Court defined
"judicial discretion" to mean:
the discretionary action of a judge or court ... bounded by the
rules and principles oflaw, and not arbitrary, capricious, or
unrestrained. It is not the indulgence of a judicial whim, but the
exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by law, or
the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the
circumstances. It is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning
the course prescribed by law and is not to give effect to the will of
the judge, but to that of the law.

Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY).
Although applied in the context of the standard of review for evidentiary rulings, the
principles guiding the exercise of judicial discretion in determining an equitable remedy should
be the same. The District Court did not recognize, much less apply, the equitable rule that a
court in equity should not order the impossible. Rather, the District Court reached its decision by
applying the substantive impossibility of performance of defense, which simply is inapplicable to
this case.

3.

The Appropriate Remedy Is An Award Of Damages

This Court has recognized on many occasions that the "usual measure of actual damages
for a purchaser's breach of contract for sale of realty is the difference between the contract price
and the market value of the property at time of breach, plus rental value for any period of
possession by the purchaser." Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 261, 846 P.2d
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904,912 (1993); see also Lawrence v. Franklin, 113 Idaho 895, 749 P.2d 1020 (Ct. App. 1988);
Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331, 597 P.2d 217 (1979). The Court has adopted the following

analysis with regard to damages for breach of a real estate contract:
The general rule applied where the purchaser under a real estate
contract refuses to go through with his purchase is that he is liable
for the vendor's loss of bargain, plus any appropriate consequential
damages. This means the vendor will recover the difference
between the market value and the contract price on the date of
breach or on the date at which he regains possession of the land ....
The rule is that the vendor's loss is measured by the market price of
the property as of breach date, not the price he obtained on resale
at a later date. The price obtained on resale may, however, be
sufficient evidence of the market value at the date of breach,
provided market conditions are similar and the time lapse between
the date of breach and the resale is not great.
Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 261 (quoting Dobbs,

HANDBOOK ON THE LA W OF REMEDIES,

§ 12.11

p. 855).
The measure of damages is clear, and specific performance of the Agreements to
Purchase the Subject Properties is not appropriate in light of the availability of this legal remedy.
'The basic, underlying rule is that equity will not intervene where the aggrieved party has a
plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law." Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 295,
410 P.2d 434 (1966). In Suchan, this Court held that the district court had abused its discretion
in ordering specific performance in favor of the vendor of real estate because the vendor had an
adequate remedy at law in the form of damages:
It cannot be seriously contended that the remedy at law via
damages was not adequate, plain, speedy, and complete in this
case. Plaintiffs commenced the action thirty-seven days after
execution of the contract. They had not taken possession of the
property. There was no rental value, nor any depreciation or
enhancement in the value of the property, to be considered.
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Vendors' damages were readily ascertainable. They could have
been made whole with a minimum of delay and inconvenience. A
judgment for the amount determined would have ended the
controversy promptly.
Jd, 90 Idaho at 303.

Those facts can be contrasted with the facts in Perron v. Hale, 108 Idaho 578, 701 P.2d
198 (1985), wherein the Court ordered specific performance of a real estate contract. In
awarding specific performance, the Court focused on the fact that the house was of a "unique
construction" and was "located in a seasonal recreation area with a limited marketing season."
Jd, 108 Idaho at 583. More importantly, the house had substantially deteriorated due to the lack

of occupancy and "the buyers had the lower level of the house altered and partially finished to
their particular desires, and buyers had done substantial damage to the walls upstairs and down
while attempting to discover building defects." Jd These facts would have made it difficult to
calculate damages. Notably, in ordering specific performance, the Court specifically recognized
that the order of specific performance was feasible in that the buyers "had sufficient cash (the
proceeds from the sale of the Nevada property) to purchase the house." Jd
Here, there is no reason Respondents would not be fully compensated by an award of
damages. Mr. Mason breached the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties on December
21, 2007, and the Respondents filed their Complaint just 31 days later. Damages can be easily
calculated by ascertaining the value of the Subject Properties as of that date, and awarding
Respondents the difference between that value and the contract price. There is no evidence that
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any the Subject Properties are unique or have deteriorated in any way4 Thus, the standard
measure of damages - the difference between the contract price and the value of the Subject
Properties as of December 21, 2007 - is the appropriate measure of damages. Given the
availability of an adequate remedy, it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to order
specific performance.
4.

The Order Of Specific Performance Results In A Windfall To Respondents

The remedy ordered by the District Court is clearly inappropriate as it will result in a
windfall to Respondents. The District Court entered a Judgment totaling almost $4.5 Million,
which is the entire contract price of the Subject Properties, plus interest. Mr. Mason obviously
cannot satisfy the Judgment. The Judgment further provides that Respondents have a valid,
subsisting vendor's lien against the Subject Properties and that said vendor's liens may be
enforced through sale of the Subject Properties in the same manner and subject to the same
restrictions as the execution sale of property subject to a decree of foreclosure as set forth in
Chapter 1 of Title 6, Idaho Code. Thus, Respondents will be able to satisfy the Judgment by
foreclosing on their vendor's lien and having the properties sold at a foreclosure sale. When the
Subject Properties are sold, Respondents will be entitled to a deficiency judgment. See Idaho
Code § 6-108. That deficiency judgment will be measured by the difference between the total
judgment and the "reasonable value" of the Subject Property on the date offoreclosure.

4

Respondents may contend that Mr. Mason's actions resulted in a Kuna sewer LID (Local
Improvement District) encumbrance on the Subject Properties in the amount of
approximately $400,000. Any damages resulting from the LID encumbrance, however, are
easily ascertainable and can be included as a measure of damages.
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Respondents will likely credit bid a portion of the judgment and walk away with the Subject
Property and a very large deficiency judgment.
Upon first glance, the measure of the deficiency judgment may look similar to the
standard measure of damages on breach of contract cases. Upon closer inspection, however,
there is a substantial difference. The standard measure of damages for a breach of real estate
contract is the "difference between the contract price and the market value of the property at time
of breach." Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 261, 846 P.2d 904, 912 (1993). In contrast, the measure of a
deficiency judgment would be the difference between the total Judgment and the value of the
Subject Properties at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Idaho Code § 6-108. The difference is
likely substantial in light of the declining real estate values in Idaho.
Mr. Mason agreed to purchase the Subject Properties on April 12, 2006, close to the
height of the Idaho real estate bubble. He was in breach of the Agreements to Purchase the
Subject Properties on December 21, 2007. By that time, the Idaho real estate bubble had burst,
and real estate values were declining. The value of the Subject Properties as of December 21,
2007 was certainly lower than the contract price, and the Respondents would be entitled to
damages in the amount of the difference (likely hundreds of thousands of dollars).
Since that time, however, real estate values have plummeted. By the time the Subject
Properties are sold in a foreclosure sale, the value of the Subject Properties will almost certainly
be much lower (likely hundreds of thousands, if not over a million, dollars). At the end of the
day, the deficiency judgment against Mr. Mason will certainly be much higher than a damages
judgment would have been. The deficiency judgment will be much larger than the difference
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between the contract price and the value of the property at the time of the breach. Thus,
Respondents will walk away with a windfall.

C.

The Order Of Attorneys' Fees Should Be Reversed
If this Court reverses the order of specific performance, this case should be remanded to

the District Court for a determination of an appropriate remedy at law. Upon remand,
Respondent will no longer be the prevailing party. Respondent may be the prevailing party at
some future time, but not until after an appropriate remedy at law has been ordered after remand.

IV.
CONCLUSION
This case is a standard, run-of-the-mill breach of contract case. Mr. Mason has never
contested that he is in breach of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties. Rather, the
only issue in this case is the appropriate remedy for that breach. The appropriate remedy is the
standard damages remedy - the difference between the contract price and the value of the
property at the time of breach - that this Court has awarded on multiple occasions in connection
with the breach of a real estate contract. By ordering specific performance, the District Court
ignored the "basic, underlying rule ... that equity will not intervene where the aggrieved party
has a plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law." Suchan, 90 Idaho at 295.
Moreover, the District Court erred by failing to apply the correct legal principle that a court
should not order an equitable remedy that is not feasible. Instead, the Court applied and rejected
the inapplicable legal defense of impossibility of performance. For these reasons, Mr. Mason
respectfully asks that this Court reverse the order of summary judgment and remand to the
District Court with instructions to conduct proceedings to determine an appropriate remedy
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measured by the difference between the contract price and the value of the Subject Property at
the time of breach.

4
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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case
This case is about the appropriate remedy to be applied in the case of a breach by the

purchaser of a contract to purchase real estate. Rather than award the standard measure of
damages recognized by this Court - the difference between the contract price and the value of
the real estate at the time of breach - the District Court ordered specific performance of the
contract. The District Court's order of specific performance is erroneous in that it ignored two
fundamental rules of equity: (I) that a court should not order an equitable remedy, including
specific performance, that is not feasible; and (2) that equity will not intervene where the
aggrieved party has a plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law.

B.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings

1.

Background Of Mr. Mason

Mr. Mason has been developing and building single-family and multi-family
communities in Idaho for seventeen years. Since 1990, he has been involved in the development
of approximately 30 single-family subdivisions and 8 multi-family projects. Each of those
subdivisions/projects involved some element of bank or investor financing. See R., Exh. I
(sealed)1 (Affidavit of Edward J. Mason, ~ 3).

2.

The Agreements To Purchase The Subject Properties, And Mr. Mason's
Breach Of Those Agreements

Many of the facts relevant to this case are taken from Mr. Mason's financial records, which
are confidential in nature and are subject to a Protective Order entered by the District Court.
The affidavits setting forth confidential financial information were filed under seal with the
District Court and have been lodged with this Court as part of a sealed record.
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On April 12, 2006, Mr. Mason entered into two separate Real Estate Purchase and Sale
Agreements. See R., Exh. 2 (Affidavit of Frank 1. Fazzio, Jr., "2-3). The first Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that Mr. Mason would purchase a residence and a parcel
of real property on which the residence is located from Respondents Dr. and Mrs. Fazzio for the
price of$I,530,000. [d. The second Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement provided that
Mr. Mason would purchase two parcels of real property consisting of farmland from Respondent
Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, for the price of $2,000,000. [d. at' 4. Each Real Estate
Purchase and Sale Agreement provided for a closing date of February 26, 2007. [d. Mr. Mason
was not able to close on the purchase of the properties on February 26, 2007. [d. at, 6. Thus,
Mr. Mason was in breach of both Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreements as of that date.
The parties subsequently entered into two separate Agreements to Resolve Dispute
Arising Out of Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement Dated April 12, 2006 (the "Agreements
to Purchase the Subject Properties").2 Id. at' 9, Exhs. A-B. The Agreements to Purchase the
Subject Properties provided that they superseded the original Real Estate Purchase and Sale
Agreements. [d. The terms of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties required
Mr. Mason to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties by December 21, 2007 if Mason
obtained plat approval by that date from the city of Kuna. [d. If plat approval was not obtained
by December 21,2007, then Mr. Mason was required to close by March 21, 2008. Id. The city
of Kuna approved the preliminary plat prior to December 21, 2007, but Mr. Mason was not able

2

The properties that are the subject of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties are
the same properties Mr. Mason had previously agreed to purchase and will hereinafter be
referred to as the "Subject Properties."
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to close on the purchase of the properties. ld. at 'if 11. Thus, Mr. Mason was in breach of the
Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties as of December 21, 2007.
3,

Mr. Mason's Inability To Close On The Purchase Of The Subject Properties

At all times during the negotiations for the purchase of the Subject Properties, Mr. Mason
believed that he would be able to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties. The real estate
market in Idaho was strong and bank andlor investor financing for real estate developments was
readily available. Subsequent to the negotiations to purchase the Subject Properties, however,
there has been a significant downturn in the Idaho real estate market, property values have fallen,
and the availability of financing for real estate developments has decreased substantially. See
R., Exh. 1 (sealed) (Affidavit of Edward 1. Mason,. 'if'if 5-6).
At all times subsequent to the negotiations to purchase the Subject Properties, Mr. Mason
has made diligent efforts to close on the purchase of the Subject Property. However, he simply
has been unable to do so because he cannot obtain the necessary financing. Attempts have been
made to obtain financing from many different sources. See id. at 7-8.
The original plan was to obtain financing through First Horizon Construction Lending
("First Horizon"). First Horizon initiated an appraisal on the Subject Property, which indicated
an "infeasibility issue with the project, in that the costs to acquire/develop exceed values
generated." Furthermore, with the downturn in the Idaho real estate market, the Boise office of
First Horizon closed in December 2007, laying off all employees, including its loan manager.
Before going out of business in December 2007, after extensive financial documentation and
meetings, First Horizon approved a financing package that required a high equity position. First
Horizon agreed to finance just over $1,800,000 of the purchase price. When Mr. Mason was

-343464.0001.1793506.1

unable to obtain an equity partner for the remainder ofthe purchase price, he informed
Dr. Fazzio of the situation and requested that he agree to carry a portion of the financing through
an owner-financing arrangement. Dr. Fazzio refused. See id. at 9.
In January 2008, First Horizon announced that it was closing its national construction
lending division and all pending loan financing was terminated. Thus, financing through First
Horizon is no longer a viable option. See id. at 10-11.
Mr. Mason also attempted to obtain financing through Eagle Equity Group, which is an
investor group that has helped finance some ofMr. Mason's other developments. The Eagle
Equity Group declined to finance the purchase of the Subject Property. See id. at 12.
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through the RBC Builder Financial Group,
which helped finance the acquisition and development of the Galiano Subdivision, a subdivision
Mr. Mason is developing adjacent to the Subject Property. RBC informed Mr. Mason that no
additional financing of a large subdivision would be approved due to the excess lot inventory and
poor market conditions in the area. RBC announced in March 2008 that it was closing its
western offices and that it would only have ongoing U.S. operations in the Southeast and Texas.
Thus, financing in Idaho through the RBC is no longer available. See id. at 13.
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through Fred Berman, who has invested in
many of his developments. Mr. Berman declined to invest in the project. See id. at 14.
Mr. Mason attempted to obtain financing through Magnet Bank, which is currently
financing one of his developments, the Ambleside subdivision. The Magnet Bank declined to
help finance the purchase of the Subject Properties due to the depressed market conditions and
the excess lot inventory and current financing of the Ambleside subdivision. In November 2007,
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the Eagle Magnet Bank was shut down overnight with employees arriving to locked doors. See
id. at 15.

In February 2008, Mr. Mason attended a National Association of Homebuilders
convention. Mr. Mason presented information regarding the financing of the Subject Properties
to various banking and investor professionals attending the conference. He encountered a
general lack of financing available for development projects due to the depressed real estate and
financial markets. The only individual who expressed interest in the project was Meg Kelley,
who is a Commercial &

Resid~ntial

Loan Officer with the Patriot National Bank in Stamford,

Connecticut, and who also has ties to several independent investors and hedge funds. See id. at
16.
Mr. Mason provided additional information and financial documentation to Meg Kelley,
but the Patriot National Bank was not interested in providing financing. However, Meg Kelley
located an investor from New York that was interested in a conference call to discuss the project.
Ted Mason Signature Homes, Inc. staff, Meg Kelley and the investor had a conference call to
discuss feasibility. The investor reviewed the financial ratio requirements of investment as well
as terms. Mr. Mason is not able to satisfy these high equity-to-debt ratios or liquidity
requirements, so the investor was not interested in investing in any project at this time with
Mr. Mason. In further conversations with Meg Kelly, she indicated that Mr. Mason and his
companies would need to have a stronger balance sheet before national investors would be
interested in reviewing specific projects. See id. at 17.
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Mr. Mason has also spoken with three other private lenders: Hopkins Financial Services;
Excelsior Management; and Seattle Funding Group, Ltd. Each of these private lenders would
require an equity investor, which Mr. Mason has not been able to obtain. See id. at 18.
Mr. Mason continues to look for a way to finance the purchase of the Subject Property.
Indeed, he would still like to close on the purchase of the Subject Property. However, given his
current financial situation, the depressed real estate market and the increasingly tightened credit
market, there is no way he can close on the purchase of the Subject Property. See id. at 4, 19.
Moreover, closing on the properties in question would not be made possible by
liquidating assets. The vast majority of Mr. Mason's assets are in the form of real property,
which serves as the collateral on bank loans. Not only would it be extremely difficult to sell that
property under the current real estate market conditions, but in most cases Mr. Mason already
owes the banks more than the appraised value ofthe property. Thus, liquidating those assets
would not provide any cash with which to close on the properties. See R., Exh. 3 (sealed)
(Supplemental Affidavit of Edward J. Mason,

~~

3-11).

In order to close on the Idaho Livestock Company, LLC property, Mr. Mason would need
to have cash available in the amount of$2,000,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
In order to close on the Fazzio property, Mr. Mason would need to have cash available in the
amount of $1 ,530,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Thus, the total amount of
cash that would be required to close on the Subject Properties is well over $3.5 Million.
Mr. Mason does not have in his possession, nor does he have access to, the over $3.5 Million that
would be required to close on the purchase of the Subject Properties. See R., Exh. 1 (sealed)
(Affidavit of Edward J. Mason,

~

22).
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If this Court were to affirm the District Court's Order of specific performance ordering
Mr. Mason to close on the Subject Property, he simply will not be able to comply with that order.

4.

Procedural Posture

Respondents filed the Complaint on January 22, 2008. R., p. 6-68. The Complaint
alleged that Mr. Mason breached his contractual obligations under the Agreements to Purchase
the Subject Properties. Respondents subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asking
the Court to either (l) confirm the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties as arbitration
awards; or (2) enter a judgment for specific performance. Specifically, Respondents requested a
"Judgment for specific performance .... [rJequiring Mason to immediately close on the
purchase ofthe Subject Properties." R., Exh. I, p. 10.
Mr. Mason opposed the motion for summary judgment on grounds that specific
performance should not be ordered because it would be impossible for Mr. Mason to close on the
purchase of the subject properties. R., Exh. 2 (sealed). Mr. Mason relied on this Court's
repeated recognition of the equitable rules that a court of equity should not order a remedy,
including specific performance, that is not feasible and that an equitable remedy should not be
ordered where there exists and adequate remedy at law. Mr. Mason did not contest the fact that
he breached the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties, nor did Mr. Mason assert the
substantive impossibility of performance defense. Despite the fact that the substantive
impossibility of performance defense was never asserted by Mr. Mason, the District Court, the
Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the
substantive impossibility of performance defense. R., Exhs. 4-5. Mr. Mason responded by
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explaining that the substantive impossibility of performance defense is inapplicable to this case
and is a different defense than that being asserted by Mr. Mason. R., Exh. 4.
In a December 30, 2008 Order, Judge Sticklen granted Respondents' Motion for
Summary Judgment, ordering that "[sJpecific performance on the contract is to be completed
within thirty days of the date of this order; if not so accomplished, a judgment for the purchase
price may be entered, upon satisfaction of which the properties must be conveyed to Mason."

R., pp. 78-83. As Mr. Mason had previously made clear, he was unable to comply with the order
of specific performance because he did not have the means to close on the Subject Properties.
Mr. Mason appealed from the Order, but that appeal was dismissed as premature because
a final judgment had not yet been issued. Mr. Mason then sought reconsideration of the Order,
which was denied by the Honorable Richard D. Greenwood, who had since replaced Judge
Sticklen. Judge Greenwood entered a final Judgment (the "Judgment") in favor of Respondents
Dr. and Mrs. Fazzio in the principal amount of $1 ,530,000, plus interest in the amount of
$412,471.08. See Order to Augment the Record, dated November 17, 2009, Exh. I. Judge

Greenwood also entered Judgment in favor of Respondent Idaho Livestock Company, LLC, in
the amount of $2,000,000, plus interest in the amount of $539, 177.66. Id. The Judgment further
provides that Respondents have a valid, subsisting vendor's lien against the Subject Properties
and that said vendor's liens may be enforced through sale of the Subject Properties in the same
manner and subject to the same restrictions as the execution sale of property subject to a decree
of foreclosure as set forth in Chapter 1 of Title 6, Idaho Code. Id. Judge Greenwood also
awarded attorneys' fees and costs in favor of respondents in the sum of$36,999.50. See Order
Granting Motion to Augment Record, dated October 6, 2009.
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II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
(1)

Whether the District Court erred in ordering specific performance of the

Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties, where the Respondent had an adequate remedy
at law and where the order of specific performance was not feasible.
(2)

Whether, upon reversal of the order granting specific performance, this Court

should also reverse the award of attorney fees on grounds that Respondent is not the prevailing
party.3
III.
ARGUMENT

A.

Standard Of Review
The Court reviews an order of specific performance for an abuse of discretion. Mallory

v. Watt, 100 Idaho 119,123,594 P.2d 629, 633 (1979). When determining whether a district
court abused its discretion, the Court considers three factors: "(I) whether the trial court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with applicable legal principles, and (3) whether it reached its

3

Mr. Mason had initially indicated that he would be appealing the District Court's order of
attorney fees with regard to the amount of the attorneys' fees award. After further review of
the issue, Mr. Mason has elected not to pursue an appeal of the reasonableness of the
amount of the attorney fees award and to focus this appeal only on the order of specific
performance. Upon reversal of the order of specific performance, however, Respondent will
not be the prevailing party, and the award of attorney fees should also be reversed as
premature.
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decision through an exercise of reason." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338,
344 (2006).
B.

The District Court Erred In Ordering Specific Performance

1.

Specific Performance Is Not Appropriate Because It Would Not Be Possible
For Mr. Mason To Comply With The Order Of Specific Performance

"There is no legal right to specific performance." Kessler v. Tortoise Development, Inc.
134 Idaho 264, 270, 1 P.3d 292, 298 (2000). Instead, specific performance "is an extraordinary
remedy that can provide relief when legal remedies are inadequate." Id "[S]pecific
performance is an equitable remedy and should not be granted when it would be unjust,
oppressive, or unconscionable." Id The decision to grant specific performance is a matter
within the District Court's discretion. Id "When making its decision the court must balance the
equities between the parties to determine whether specific performance is appropriate." Id
In ordering specific performance, the District Court did not recognize, much less follow,
the well-established rule that a court should not order an equitable remedy, including specific
performance, which is not feasible. See, e.g., Anderson v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 112, 125,227 P.2d
351,359 (1951), overruled on other grounds by David Steed and Associates, Inc. v. Young, 115
Idaho 247, 766 P.2d 717 (1988) ("Equity will not enter a decree for specific performance the
enforcement of which is not practicable or feasible. "); Paloukos v. Intermountain Chevrolet Co.,
99 Idaho 740, 745-46, 588 P.2d 939, 944-45 (1978) (dismissing claim for specific performance
because "[i]t is well established that the courts will not order the impossible"); Childs v. Reed, 34
Idaho 450, 202 P. 685,686 (1921) ("Where the contract is of such a nature that obedience to the
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deQree cannot be obtained by the ordinary processes of the court, equity will decline to
interfere. ").
It is indisputable that Mr. Mason does not have the approximately $3.5 Million that

would be required to close on the SUbject Properties as ordered by the Court. See R., Exhs. I, 3
(sealed). Thus, the District Court erred in ordering specific performance.

2.

The Equitable Rule That Equity Courts Should Not Order The Impossible Is
Separate And Distinct From The Substantive Impossibility Of Performance
Defense

The rule that equity should not order the impossible is an equitable rule, not a substantive
defense. Rather than apply the equitable rule, the Court applied and rejected the substantive
contract defense of impossibility of performance as if the two rules were one and the same. The
District Court's analysis was erroneous in that the two rules are not one and the same. The
equitable rule merely precludes an order of equitable relief and leaves the plaintiff with a remedy
in law, i.e., damages. See, e.g., Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 410 P.2d 434 (1966)
(reversing the district court's order of specific performance of a real estate contract, and
remanding to the district court to calculate damages). In other words, the equitable rule cited by
Mr. Mason goes not to the issue of liability, but to the issue of what remedy is appropriate. The
substantive impossibility of performance doctrine is a complete defense to a contract and leaves
the plaintiff with no remedy at all, either equitable or at law. See Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho
252,257,706 P.2d 1363, 1368 (Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that the substantive doctrine of
impossibility of performance results in the party asserting the defense being "relieved of his duty
to perform") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264 (1981».
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"The doctrine of impossibility operates to excuse performance when the bargained-for
performance is no longer in existence or is no longer capable of being performed due to the
unforeseen, supervening act of a third party." Haessly v. Safeeo Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121
Idaho 463, 465, 825 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1992). "A sine qua non for application of the doctrine is
that the parties must have contracted, expressly or in necessary contemplation, with reference to
continued existence of the specific thing as a condition essential to performance." Id.
The above described impossibility of performance doctrine serves as a defense to a
breach of contract claim. In other words, the impossibility of performance excuses the breach.
However, Mr. Mason has not ever asserted impossibility of performance as a defense to
Respondents' breach of contract claim because the authorities generally hold that financial
inability to perform does not excuse a breach. Moreover, "impossibility that is only temporary
will not act to discharge a contractual obligation if the contract can yet be performed after the
impossibility ceases." Sutheimer v. Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 85, 896 P.2d 989, 993 (Ct. App.
1995). Impossibility of performance for purposes of excusing a breach of contract is simply not
an issue in this case.
Despite the fact that the impossibility of performance defense was never asserted by
Mr. Mason, Judge Sticklen asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the
impossibility of performance doctrine in connection with Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment. See R., Exhs. 3-4. Mr. Mason provided supplemental briefing on the issue,
explaining the difference between the equitable rule that equitable courts should not order the
impossible and the substantive defense of impossibility of performance. See R., Exh. 4.
Mr. Mason expressly stated that he was not relying on the substantive impossibility of
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performance defense. Id. at p. 3 ("Mr. Mason is not currently asserting impossibility of
performance as a defense to Dr. Fazzio's breach of contract claim because the authorities
generally hold that financial inability to perform does not excuse a breach. . .. Impossibility of
performance for purposes of excusing a breach of contract is not at issue for purposes of
Dr. Fazzio's motion for summary judgment.").
Even though Mr. Mason specifically disclaimed any reliance on the substantive
impossibility of performance defense, Judge Sticklen proceeded to grant Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment by concluding that the substantive impossibility of performance doctrine is
inapplicable. Specifically, she explained:
Furthermore, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently noted that
"[m]ost importantly it is the task itself which must be impossibleit is not enough that the particular promissor is unable to perform
the task if it would be possible for a different promissor to
perform." State v. Chacon, [146 Idaho 520, (Ct. App. 2008)].
While this case was criminal in nature, it is still persuasive Idaho
dicta on the issue as it relates to the enforcement of contracts.
R., p. 83; see also. id. at p. 82 (citing Christy v. Pilkington, 273 S.W. 2d 533 (Ark. 1954), for the
proposition that the substantive defense of impossibility of performance does not apply to a
"subjective impossibility" of performing).
Mr. Mason does not disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the substantive
impossibility of performance defense is inapplicable. Indeed, Mr. Mason conceded the point.
The problem is that the District Court did not address the equitable rule that a court in equity
should not order the impossible.
In ordering specific performance, the District Court abused its discretion in that it applied
the wrong legal principle. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho at 873 (explaining that, in
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determining whether a district court has abused its discretion, the Court should look to whether
the district court "acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable
Idaho
,
P.3d
legal principles.") (emphasis added); see also State of
. Idaho v. Watkins, -_,2009 Opinion No. 151, Docket No. 35687 (December 24, 2009), wherein the Court defined
"judicial discretion" to mean:
the discretionary action of a judge or court ... bounded by the
rules and principles of law, and not arbitrary, capricious, or
unrestrained. It is not the indulgence of a judicial whim, but the
exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by law, or
the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the
circumstances. It is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning
the course prescribed by law and is not to give effect to the will of
the judge, but to that of the law.

Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY).
Although applied in the context of the standard of review for evidentiary rulings, the
principles guiding the exercise of judicial discretion in determining an equitable remedy should
be the same. The District Court did not recognize, much less apply, the equitable rule that a
court in equity should not order the impossible. Rather, the District Court reached its decision by
applying the substantive impossibility of performance of defense, which simply is inapplicable to
this case.

3.

The Appropriate Remedy Is An Award Of Damages

This Court has recognized on many occasions that the "usual measure of actual damages
for a purchaser's breach of contract for sale of realty is the difference between the contract price
and the market value of the property at time of breach, plus rental value for any period of
possession by the purchaser." Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 261,846 P.2d
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904,912 (1993); see also Lawrence v. Franklin, 113 Idaho 895, 749 P.2d 1020 (Ct. App. 1988);
Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331, 597 P.2d 217 (1979). The Court has adopted the following

analysis with regard to damages for breach of a real estate contract:
The general rule applied where the purchaser under a real estate
contract refuses to go through with his purchase is that he is liable
for the vendor's loss of bargain, plus any appropriate consequential
damages. This means the vendor will recover the difference
between the market value and the contract price on the date of
breach or on the date at which he regains possession of the land ....
The rule is that the vendor's loss is measured by the market price of
the property as of breach date, not the price he obtained on resale
at a later date. The price obtained on resale may, however, be
sufficient evidence of the market value at the date of breach,
provided market conditions are similar and the time lapse between
the date of breach and the resale is not great.
Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 261 (quoting Dobbs,

HANDBOOK ON THE LA W OF REMEDIES,

§ 12.11

p. 855).

The measure of damages is clear, and specific performance of the Agreements to
Purchase the Subject Properties is not appropriate in light of the availability of this legal remedy.
"The basic, underlying rule is that equity will not intervene where the aggrieved party has a
plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law." Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 295,
410 P.2d 434 (1966). In Suchan, this Court held that the district court had abused its discretion
in ordering specific performance in favor of the vendor of real estate because the vendor had an
adequate remedy at law in the form of damages:
It cannot be seriously contended that the remedy at law via
damages was not adequate, plain, speedy, and complete in this
case. Plaintiffs commenced the action thirty-seven days after
execution of the contract. They had not taken possession of the
property. There was no rental value, nor any depreciation or
enhancement in the value of the property, to be considered.
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Vendors' damages were readily ascertainable. They could have
been made whole with a minimum of delay and inconvenience. A
judgment for the amount determined would have ended the
controversy promptly.
[d., 90 Idaho at 303.

Those facts can be contrasted with the facts in Perron v, Hale, 108 Idaho 578, 701 P.2d
198 (1985), wherein the Court ordered specific performance of a real estate contract. In
awarding specific performance, the Court focused on the fact that the house was of a "unique
construction" and was "located in a seasonal recreation area with a limited marketing season."
[d., 108 Idaho at 583. More importantly, the house had substantially deteriorated due to the lack

of occupancy and "the buyers had the lower level of the house altered and partially finished to
their particular desires, and buyers had done substantial damage to the walls upstairs and down
while attempting to discover building defects," [d. These facts would have made it difficult to
calculate damages. Notably, in ordering specific performance, the Court specifically recognized
that the order of specific performance was feasible in that the buyers "had sufficient cash (the
proceeds from the sale of the Nevada property) to purchase the house," [d.
Here, there is no reason Respondents would not be fully compensated by an award of
damages. Mr. Mason breached the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties on December
21, 2007, and the Respondents filed their Complaint just 31 days later. Damages can be easily
calculated by ascertaining the value of the Subject Properties as of that date, and awarding
Respondents the difference between that value and the contract price. There is no evidence that
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any the Subject Properties are unique or have deteriorated in any way.4 Thus, the standard
measure of damages - the difference between the contract price and the value of the Subject
Properties as of December 21, 2007 - is the appropriate measure of damages. Given the
availability of an adequate remedy, it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to order
specific performance.

4.

The Order Of Specific Performance Results In A Windfall To Respondents

The remedy ordered by the District Court is clearly inappropriate as it will result in a
windfall to Respondents. The District Court entered a Judgment totaling almost $4.5 Million,
which is the entire contract price of the Subject Properties, plus interest. Mr. Mason obviously
cannot satisfy the Judgment. The Judgment further provides that Respondents have a valid,
subsisting vendor's lien against the Subject Properties and that said vendor's liens may be
enforced through sale of the Subject Properties in the same manner and subject to the same
restrictions as the execution sale of property subject to a decree of foreclosure as set forth in
Chapter 1 of Title 6, Idaho Code. Thus, Respondents will be able to satisfy the Judgment by
foreclosing on their vendor's lien and having the properties sold at a foreclosure sale. When the
Subject Properties are sold, Respondents will be entitled to a deficiency judgment. See Idaho
Code § 6-108. That deficiency judgment will be measured by the difference between the total
judgment and the "reasonable value" of the Subject Property on the date offoreclosure.

4

Respondents may contend that Mr. Mason's actions resulted in a Kuna sewer LID (Local
Improvement District) encumbrance on the Subject Properties in the amount of
approximately $400,000. Any damages resulting from the LID encumbrance, however, are
easily ascertainable and can be included as a measure of damages.
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Respondents will likely credit bid a portion of the judgment and walk away with the Subject
Property and a very large deficiency judgment.
Upon first glance, the measure of the deficiency judgment may look similar to the
standard measure of damages on breach of contract cases. Upon closer inspection, however,
there is a substantial difference. The standard measure of damages for a breach of real estate
contract is the "difference between the contract price and the market value of the property at time
of breach." Lipsky, 123 Idaho at 261, 846 P.2d 904, 912 (1993). In contrast, the measure of a
deficiency judgment would be the difference between the total Judgment and the value of the
Subject Properties at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Idaho Code § 6-108. The difference is
likely substantial in light of the declining real estate values in Idaho.
Mr. Mason agreed to purchase the Subject Properties on April 12, 2006, close to the
height of the Idaho real estate bubble. He was in breach of the Agreements to Purchase the
Subject Properties on December 21, 2007. By that time, the Idaho real estate bubble had burst,
and real estate values were declining. The value of the Subject Properties as of December 21,
2007 was certainly lower than the contract price, and the Respondents would be entitled to
damages in the amount of the difference (likely hundreds of thousands of dollars).
Since that time, however, real estate values have plummeted. By the time the Subject
Properties are sold in a foreclosure sale, the value of the Subject Properties will almost certainly
be much lower (likely hundreds of thousands, if not over a million, dollars). At the end of the
day, the deficiency judgment against Mr. Mason will certainly be much higher than a damages
judgment would have been. The deficiency judgment will be much larger than the difference
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between the contract price and the value of the property at the time of the breach. Thus,
Respondents will walk away with a windfall.

C.

The Order Of Attorneys' Fees Should Be Reversed
If this Court reverses the order of specific performance, this case should be remanded to

the District Court for a determination of an appropriate remedy at law. Upon remand,
Respondent will no longer be the prevailing party. Respondent may be the prevailing party at
some future time, but not until after an appropriate remedy at law has been ordered after remand.

IV.
CONCLUSION
This case is a standard, run-of-the-mill breach of contract case. Mr. Mason has never
contested that he is in breach of the Agreements to Purchase the Subject Properties. Rather, the
only issue in this case is the appropriate remedy for that breach. The appropriate remedy is the
standard damages remedy - the difference between the contract price and the value of the
property at the time of breach - that this Court has awarded on multiple occasions in connection
with the breach of a real estate contract. By ordering specific performance, the District Court
ignored the "basic, underlying rule ... that equity will not intervene where the aggrieved party
has a plain, speedy, adequate, and complete remedy at law." Suchan, 90 Idaho at 295.
Moreover, the District Court erred by failing to apply the correct legal principle that a court
should not order an equitable remedy that is not feasible. Instead, the Court applied and rejected
the inapplicable legal defense of impossibility of performance. For these reasons, Mr. Mason
respectfully asks that this Court reverse the order of summary judgment and remand to the
District Court with instructions to conduct proceedings to determine an appropriate remedy
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measured by the difference between the contract price and the value of the Subject Property at
the time of breach.

YL.<9
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